This paper examines the relationship between social capital and performance of fiscal institutions using provincial sub-national state level data in India during 1991-2012. Institution in India is significant and controls fiscal performances as per social need for economic development. People participation in public affairs or simply vote turnover in general election in India is taken to measure the social trust on fiscal institution. Fiscal performance in India is based on social capital. As one percent vote turnover rate rises fiscal deficit reduces by 2.6 to 2.8 percent. Empirical findings suggest that social capital indirectly control the fiscal performance of the elected government. The results are robust to a number of control variables. The strong political trust is established through high turnover rate and vote share in the election for formation of government that create the platform for sound fiscal policy decisions.
Introduction
Provincial sub-national state governments in India have accumulated large fiscal deficits or government debts during 1991-2012. Why do provincial sub-national states in India raise large debts during 1991-2012? This paper focuses on possible explanation to this question analysing the role of social capital and performance of political or fiscal institutions in India.
These institutions are particularly important for making fiscal policy decisions. Fiscal institutions create the environment, the incentives, the rules and the regulations under which budgets are drafted, approved, and implemented. Fiscal institutions promote fiscal discipline through proper design of fiscal policy 1 . Sometimes social and institutional framework may produce soft budget constraints that provide incentives for loose fiscal discipline. These rules highly vary over provincial sub-national state governments and thus provide a reasonable explanation for cross-section variations in debt levels or fiscal deficit performance levels 2 (Alesina and Perotti 1995; Poterba and von Hagen 1999; Persson and Tabellini 2001) .
In this context we should mentioned major difference between quantitative and procedural institutions (Buchanan 1980) . Quantitative rules entail tax and expenditures limitation laws, debt brakes and other formal restraints to balance the budget. Empirical observation of Bohn and Inman (1996) , Poterba (1997) and Shadbegian (1998) suggest that the budget rules support the fiscal discipline for policy makers. Procedural institutions define how property rights over political decisions are acquired, and assign authority to exercise them. Persson and Tabellini (2003) observed that the constitutional design of the regime type and the electoral rules crucially and significantly shape the fiscal policy decisions. However, it is impossible to design a constitution to establish a framework of quantitative and procedural institutions that answers all future questions of a society. So, there is certain degree of uncertainty. Hence, trust becomes a crucial aspect. Without uncertainty, trust is insignificant 1 Voters (citizens) elect politicians to make decisions about public spending and also provide the funds by paying taxes. There are two aspects (i) the principal-agent relationship between voters (the principals) and politicians (the agents), and (ii) the common pool problem of public finances -these are important for the conduct of fiscal policy. Elected politicians can extract rents from being in office. They use some of the funds entrusted to them to pursue their own interests, be it outright in corruption, for perks, etc. Voters might wish to eliminate the opportunity to extract rents by subjecting politicians to rules stipulating what they can and must do under given conditions or contracts. But the need is to react to unforeseen developments and the complexity of the situation makes the writing of such contracts impossible. Similarly, politicians cannot realistically commit fully to promises made during election campaigns. Hence, like principal-agent relations in many other settings, the voter-politician relationship resembles an "incomplete contract" (Seabright (1996) , Persson et al. (1997a, b) , Tabellini (2000) , von Hagen (2002) ).
2 There is growing interest in how political and institutional factors affect fiscal performance at national level (Roubini and Sachs 1989 , Hagen 1992 , Alesina and Perotti 1996 , 1997 Poterba 1996 , Strauch and von Hagen 2000 , Perotti and Kontopoulos 2002 and local levels (Dafflon 2002, Hagen and Vabo 2005) .
issue because certainty ensures same outcomes with or without a trusting act involved (Guerra and Zizzo 2003) . Mutual trust in the case of uncertainty reduces transaction costs and makes the institution to work smoothly (Putnam et al. 1993 , Putnam 2000 Fukuyama 1995) .
Trust is one of the most important and highly significant components of a social capital 3 , which is embed with the institution. Here, social trust plays the most important role in fiscal policy decisions. So, it is reasonable to assume that social trust/capital fosters fiscal discipline in all society.
The paper concentrates initially on the relationship between social capital and fiscal deficit and later analyses in details using the sample of major Indian provincial states over the period 1991 -2012. Here, trust is measured in two ways (i) as the percentage vote turnover during general election in India, i.e., trust on delegates or representatives for the political institution and measuring the level of citizens' chance to express their preferences, (ii) as the performance of the delegates in the policy making body (i.e., the parliament), i.e., work efforts in the policy making institute and measuring it in terms of working days or business hours in the decision making process. Percentage vote turnover definitely helps to increase governmental responsibility and accountability. It is true that the government is forced to be responsive to citizens' preferences and underlying social contract rule, which leads to a higher level of fiscal discipline. So, our basic hypothesis is that higher level of social trust on delegates leads to a stronger fiscal discipline.
Institutional and Cultural frameworks typical for specific countries might influence trust. The problem is that such features cannot always be controlled in a satisfactory manner. This paper focuses on within country data at the state level. Here, trust variable that measures the choice behaviour expressed at the election that reduces possible subjective biases derived from survey questionnaires. Several studies work with cross-sectional data. In this paper panel data analysis allows exploiting time variation in trust.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a quick overview of the literature. Section 3 describes data and methodology adopted in this study. Section 4 discusses the results and follows the empirical implementation of the impact of trust on fiscal performance. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
3 Concept of social capital is multidimensional and it emerges from different aspects of social life. The work of Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) have renewed interest on it in the social basis of political and economic development. Putnam (1993) shows the importance of social capital for the effective governance in a democratic social system. According to Putnam (1993) social capital is the features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.
Literature Review
The concept of social capital evolves over time 4 and it has been defined in several ways.
Social capital is the network of objective relationships (structural dimension) that people and organizations have, and subjective relationships (cognitive dimension) that linked to norms and trust in other people and organizations. Initially the social organization is considered as social capital, 'facilitating the achievement of goals that could not be achieved in its absence or could be achieved only at a higher cost' (Coleman (1990) ). Putnam et al (1993) the stock of social capital and its relation to economic development, especially, low crime rates and reduction of other social problems. Countries/regions with relatively higher stocks of social capital, in terms of generalized trust and widespread civic engagement seem to achieve higher levels of growth, compared to societies with low trust (Putnam et al. 1993 ).
Social capital contributes to economic growth by focusing the importance of trust and cooperation within firm, industry, market and the state. Thus, social capital truly greases the wheels that allow nations to advance smoothly and creates the base for economic prosperity.
Economic development of a nation depends on the impact of social capital which includes social culture, social norms and regulations that promote economic reforms and development 4 Truly the concept of social capital has a long history in the social sciences. The concept of social capital has been developed primarily in the subjects of sociology and political science. It has become popular in several fields of policymaking and research. Bourdieu (1980 Bourdieu ( , 1986 , Coleman (1988 Coleman ( , 1990 and Putnam (1993 Putnam ( , 1995 Putnam ( , 2000 are credited for introducing the concept of social capital and popularized it.
activities. Social capital in the sense of trust among members of a civil society and social cohesion fosters institutional activities. Interactions among citizens build up social trust.
Interaction between trust (thought of as an individual behaviour) and public policy seems to be important to increase the effectiveness of fiscal performance 5 . In this study we propose one of the fundamental reasons focusing on the country specific quality of informal institutions. Social capital refers to the notion of informal institutions which is a proxy of the level of generalized trust 6 .
Initially, Almond and Verba (1963) investigated the concept of trust intensively. Recently the work of Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) have renewed interest on it in the social basis of political and economic development. Putnam (1993) shows the importance of social capital for the effective governance in a democratic social system. According to Putnam (1993) social capital is the features of social organization, which can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions. Bourdieu (1979) and Coleman (1988 Coleman ( , 1990 have strongly influenced the social capital literature focusing on individuals and small societal units. Portes and Mooney (2002) point out that social capital is the ability to secure resources by virtue of membership in social networks or larger social structures. Knack and Keefer (1997) investigated the impact of civic duty and trust on growth and investment rates in a cross section analysis. Knack and Keefer (1997) find a strong and significant positive relationship between social capital variables and economic growth. Looking at the public finance literature, Slemrod (1998) argues that the 5 Information asymmetry hampers the proper functioning of markets, and its result is the market failure. 'Benevolent Government' maximise social welfare and it can prevent market failure by providing public goods, for instance. Since information is asymmetry between government and citizens, it is difficult for citizens to evaluate the government's activities. This leads politicians and bureaucrats to behave in a way that maximises self-interest. The government is forced to be efficient to maximise social welfare, resulting in economic growth, if citizens can obtain sufficient information about the government's activities. 6 Trust results from interactions that span co-worker, team, organizational and inter-organizational alliances. Trust is closely tied to the norms, values and beliefs of the organizational culture. Trust is the outcome of communications behaviours, such as providing accurate information, explanations for decisions and demonstrating sincere and appropriate openness. Trust is constantly changing as it cycles through phases of building, destabilization and dissolving. Trust consists of multiple factors at cognitive, emotional and behavioural levels, all of which affect individual's perceptions of trust. The degree to which person agree on who has rightful power to influence others. For the most stable, positive relationship, organizations and publics must have some degree of control over each other. So, trust can only be considered in the broader context of the relationships an organization has with its various publics. Citizens expect public organizations to do things for the society for which organizations get little or nothing in return, that is how they develop trust.
social capital derived from the willingness to pay taxes voluntarily lowers the cost of the operating government and of equitably assigning its cost to citizens 7 .
The World Bank is also focusing on social capital and investigating the practical relevance of this concept 8 . There are several views on social capital (Grootaert 2001): First, the concept developed by Putnam et al. (1993) interpreting social capital as a social network, as networks of civic engagement facilitating coordination and cooperation. Second, Coleman's (1988, p. 598) approach defines social capital as "a variety of different entities", consisting of some aspects of social structure and facilitating certain actions of actors. This allows taking into account not only horizontal but also vertical social relationships. Third concept considers the social and political environment that enforces norms and shapes social structures.
Our investigation in this paper grounds basically on the third concept, which takes the more formalized institutional relationship between state and citizens at the vertical level into account. As trust is a multidimensional concept, we restrict our focus on a specific dimension: citizens' political trust. This is in line with Rothstein (2003) services and it may also stimulate economic development. On the other hand, the absence of trust reduces the radius of cooperation with family and friends and make more difficult for government to rely on the support of citizens (Fukuyama 1995 Moreover, little social fragmentation in the society reduces the asymmetry between spending claims of different interest groups and taxing decisions. Therefore, a more homogenous citizenry supports fiscal discipline.
Government accountability can be seen as the most important aspect of trust with respect to fiscal performance. Engagement, involvement and participation in political and public issues by a large part of the electorate are an important feature to hold politicians and bureaucrats accountable. If decision makers expect citizens to hold them politically accountable, they are more inclined to temper their worst impulses rather than face public protests. Political participation in general election allows citizens to discuss on developmental agenda and also definitely helps to improve political awareness. So, the government knows that citizens are discussing and monitoring their behaviour, which will produce the incentive to govern more effectively 9 .
There is certain amount of scepticism or distrust in political institutions by citizens. Since distrust is often thought to make people abstain from politics, scholars look at turnout at general elections. Trust is depressed when citizens believe that politicians do not care about people like themselves and are dissatisfied about how the national economy is managed.
Characteristics of a country's political institutions tend to depress turnout (Rose 2004 In order to test whether social capital fosters fiscal discipline, we propose the following equation:
FDit = α +β SCit +λ T + ηi + Zit +εit
Where FD fiscal deficit of ith state in t year, SC denotes social capital, T is time trend, η is state effect, Z is other control variables 14 , and ε is the disturbance term. The two sorts of regressions differ in the scaling of their left-hand variable. Matsusaka 2003 or Feld, Schaltegger and Schnellenbach, 2004 
Results

Insert Fig 1& 2
Using Indian state panel data we estimate equation (1) for level variables and also for transformation variables (i.e., log transformation or log value of original variable). Applying panel data techniques the estimated result of log of fiscal deficit is presented in Table 2 .
Strong variation among states as well as over time allows exploiting within-state variation to identify effects of trust on performance of government. Trust has a statistically significant negative impact on fiscal discipline in all regressions, controlling for other determinants. Here Insert Table 2 The results indicate that we find a fairly robust negative relationship between social trust and fiscal deficit. So, fiscal policy is strongly influenced by social trust measured in terms of vote turnover to support political agenda 16 and form the government in the country.
We use information from voter participation on general election for forming government to perform fiscal activities. Selecting few other fiscal indicators this paper also examines the various social determining factors. Table 3 interest payment, which suggest that educated and associated people want development and they are also ready to pay for it in terms of interest payment.
Here Insert Table 3 maintenance of city infrastructure such as higher education, traffic, public health, public security or cultural facilities require high government revenue for the city. At the same time, the tax bases in cities are sensitive to high tax burdens. People react to tax incentives and move from the city center to nearby local communities where the tax burden is lower. The asymmetry of spending claims and revenue capacity is often seen as a major driving force for problems of fiscal discipline in urban jurisdictions (Frey, 1990; Brueckner, 1983) . Sociodemographical factors such as the share of elderly and the share of pupils expectably push up debt-levels, too. These two groups only perceive a small fraction of the initiated costs eventually creating pressure for higher government spending. In addition, especially pensioners have an incentive to finance public services by deficit spending in order to postpone the costs to future generations (Meltzer and Richard, 1981) . The language variable is significantly negative indicating that the South Indian non-Hindi speaking people cares more about fiscal discipline than North Indian Hindi speaking counterparts. The other control variables have not a robust and significant impact on public debt. 16 If social cohesion in the electorate is strong, it is easier for the government to implement policies according to the preferences of the electorate (Matsusaka, 2004) .
To capture multifaceted features or dimensions, we construct social capital index using principal component analysis. The results of the Principal Component Analysis are summarized in Table 4 . Social capital index has been calculated using the component loading weight. Hence, each of the elements loads powerfully onto one underlying component extracted from the data. Note that social capital index comprises both structural (i.e., associational life including political involvement) and a cultural aspects (i.e., the crime rate).
So, this social capital index takes account of the dual nature of the concept.
Here Insert Table 4 Here, this study focuses on major dimension of social capital such as associational life, cultural life etc. Major components of social capital are voting turnover, average household size, literacy and crime rate. Single social capital index is formulated assigning weights, which are taken from principal component analysis (Table 4) . Vote turnover rate and literacy rate have positive contribution to social capital index and indicate social preference of public goods, while average family size and crime rate assign negative value to social capital index. higher weight compare to other indicators. Negative value is associated with crime rate. It is justified because more crime rate indicates less trust prevails in the society -it is also indicate the antitrust to social development and also reveals the law and order situation or weak government or/and institution. Table 5 and Table 6 describe the impact of the major components of social capital on revenue generation which is a vital component of fiscal performance. Revenue source of the states are mainly own tax and own nontax. Vote turnover rate is highly significant but its impact on revenue collection is different and in opposite direction, i.e., own tax revenue falls as vote turnover increases while own nontax revenue rises. It indicates that higher social (trust) capital reduces own tax (or direct tax) revenue while increases indirect tax. Crime rate has positive impact on tax revenue. This suggests that as crime rate increases social general trust is reduced thereby social capital declines which may force to increase both tax and nontax revenues. Larger size of associational life reduces tax revenues whereas literacy rate has positive impact on it. ONTR declines with increasing population density and seat margin.
Here Insert Table 5 Components of social capital are replaced by social capital index and repeat the exercise and results are presented in Table 6 . Combining major social dimensions all types of social capital index has indirect effect on tax revenue but direct effect on nontax revenue. Here, higher value of social index indicates higher level of social capital that suggests less direct tax burden and more indirect tax.
Here Insert Table 6 Here Insert Table 7 Table 7 presents panel data estimated fiscal deficit. We compare results of pooled and random effect model in panel data analysis. Social capital determines fiscal deficit directly.
Seat margin in the general election has strong and direct impact on determining fiscal deficit.
Conclusion
This paper provides evidence for the hypothesis that social capital influences fiscal performance. Empirical results in India suggest that social capital indirectly control the fiscal performance of the elected government. Fiscal deficit reduces by 2.6% to 2.8 % if one percent vote turnover rate rises. The strong political trust is established through vote turnover and vote share in the election for formation of government that create the platform for sound fiscal policy decisions and hence the lower public deficits. The results are robust to a number of control variables and inclusion of additional variables. We use information from direct voter participation on political issues and government formation. In order to take both aspects of trust into account -trust among members of a society and trust between the incumbent and the constituency -we collected data from all general elections held during 1991-2012. These results are consistent with those reported by Putnam et al. (1993) from Italian regions, Keefer and Knack (1997) or Zak and Knack (2001) from cross-country regressions or Knack (1999) from US state governments for government performance.
The results presented in this paper as well as in previous studies underline the importance of social capital as an essential aspect for the well functioning of a government and the Note: '***', '**' and '*' denote the level of statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Note: SCC is generated using above weights. 
